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a mechanism, this may in one sense be admitted; but as against this view
it must be remarked -
1. That such deviations from the normal scheme of an instinct as cannot
be referred to conscious deliberation are not provided for by any predis-
position in this mechanism.
2. That heredity is only possible under the circumstances of a constant
superintendence of the embryonic development by a purposive uncon-
scious activity of growth. It must be admitted, however, that this is in-
fluenced in return by the predisposition existing in the germ.
3. That the impressing of the predisposition upon the individual from
whom it is inherited can only be effected by long practice, consequently
the instinct without auxiliary mechanism {105a} is the originating cause
of the auxiliary mechanism.
4. That none of those instinctive actions that are performed rarely, or
perhaps once only, in the lifetime of any individual - as, for example,
those connected with the propagation and metamorphoses of the lower
forms of life, and none of those instinctive omissions of action, neglect
of which necessarily entails death - can be conceived as having become
engrained into the character through habit; the ganglionic constitution,
therefore, that predisposes the animal towards them must have been
fashioned purposively.
5. That even the presence of an auxiliary mechanism {105b} does not
compel the unconscious to a particular corresponding mode of instinc-
tive action, but only predisposes it. This is shown by the possibility of
departure from the normal type of action, so that the unconscious pur-
pose is always stronger than the ganglionic constitution, and takes any
opportunity of choosing from several similar possible courses the one
that is handiest and most convenient to the constitution of the individual.
We now approach the question that I have reserved for our final one, - Is
there, namely, actually such a thing as instinct, {105c} or are all so-
called instinctive actions only the results of conscious deliberation?
In support of the second of these two views, it may be alleged that the
more limited is the range of the conscious mental activity of any living
being, the more fully developed in proportion to its entire mental power
is its performance commonly found to be in respect of its own limited
and special instinctive department. This holds as good with the lower
animals as with men, and is explained by the fact that perfection of pro-
ficiency is only partly dependent upon natural capacity, but is in great
measure due to practice and cultivation of the original faculty. A phi-
lologist, for example, is unskilled in questions of jurisprudence; a natural
philosopher or mathematician, in philology; an abstract philosopher, in
poetical criticism. Nor has this anything to do with the natural talents of
the several persons, but follows as a consequence of their special
training. The more special, therefore, is the direction in which the men-
tal activity of any living being is exercised, the more will the whole de-
veloping and practising power of the mind be brought to bear upon this
one branch, so that it is not surprising if the special power comes ulti-
mately to bear an increased proportion to the total power of the individ-
ual, through the contraction of the range within which it is exercised.
Those, however, who apply this to the elucidation of instinct should not
forget the words, in proportion to the entire mental power of the animal
in question, and should bear in mind that the entire mental power be-
comes less and less continually as we descend the scale of animal life,
whereas proficiency in the performance of an instinctive action seems to
be much of a muchness in all grades of the animal world. As, therefore,
those performances which indisputably proceed from conscious delib-
eration decrease proportionately with decrease of mental power, while
nothing of the kind is observable in the case of instinct - it follows that
instinct must involve some other principle than that of conscious
intelligence. We see, moreover, that actions which have their source in
conscious intelligence are of one and the same kind, whether among the
lower animals or with mankind - that is to say, that they are acquired by
apprenticeship or instruction and perfected by practice; so that the say-
ing, Age brings wisdom, holds good with the brutes as much as with
ourselves. Instinctive actions, on the contrary, have a special and dis-
tinct character, in that they are performed with no less proficiency by
animals that have been reared in solitude than by those that have been
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